rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents …

This paper studies the equilibrating process of several implementation mechanisms using naive adaptive dynamics. We … way we cast some doubt on the criticism of "complexity" commonly used against this mechanism. For mechanisms that use more … refined equilibrium concepts have claimed that the mechanisms they propose are "simple" and implement "everything" (in …

rational expectations. We use simple direct mechanisms, in which agents report only first-order beliefs. While level 0 agents …

mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i ….e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic complementarities. In quasilinear environments, I prove that if a social choice … interval among all supermodular mechanisms. This is followed by conditions for supermodular implementability in unique …

. However, this concept has serious drawbacks. In particular, many strategy-proof mechanisms have multiple Nash equilibria, some …

for practical implementation mechanisms …