consumers. The incumbent is fully informed about the entrant's quality. This leads to price signalling rivalry because the …

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

In Spence's (1973) signaling by education model and in many of its extensions, firms can only infer workers …' productivities. We characterize the trade-offs between signaling by workers and costly information acquisition by firms. Information … workers have low productivity. Our analysis applies also to other signaling problems, e.g. the financial structure of firms …

characterize the trade–offs between signaling by workers and costly auditing by firms. Auditing is always associated with (partial …

characteristic of the sender. This result stands in stark contrast to a scenario in which no signaling is involved. We fully describe …

equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the … good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signalling game …

incentive compatible? When the market is pessimistic, is it better to give up or keep signaling? We introduce hidden actions in … a dynamic signaling model in order to answer these questions. Separation is found to be fast in equilibrium when sending … quality of the asset, depending on the cost structure, the seller either “gives-up” by stopping signaling, or the seller …

known to consumers. Each firm can make an imperfect disclosure of its product quality before engaging in price-signaling …, in one of the separating regimes, price signaling leads to intense price competition between the firms under which not …