This paper studies the effectiveness of lifetime employment as a strategic commitment in a three-stage Cournot model with two identical labour-managed income-per-worker-maximizing firms. In the first stage, one labour-managed firm is allowed to offer lifetime employment. In the second stage, the...

The article examines the firm's choice of incentives when workers face additional incentives (external incentives) to those provided by the firm, such as building reputation that improves the workers' prospects with other employers, or satisfaction from working well. Surprisingly, the firm might...

In economic contests or tournaments where monitoring of the actions taken by contestants is imperfect competition is likely to drive not just work effort but other choices at the workers' discretion that increase the probability of winning. For example, when workers compete for promotion,...

We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior...

This paper develops a positive model of informal contracting in which rewards and punishments are not determined by an ex ante optimal plan but instead express the ex post moral sentiments of the arbitrating party. We consider a subjective performance evaluation problem in which a principal can...

We study information disclosure and diversification in contests with technological uncertainty, where agents can pursue different technologies to compete in the contest, but there is uncertainty regarding which will be implemented ex post. The principal can credibly reveal some information about...

There are many situations in which a customer's proclivity to buy the product of any firm depends not only on the classical attributes of the product such as its price and quality, but also on who else is buying the same product. We model these situations as games in which firms compete for...

We devise a nonparametric test of strategic behavior in a multiproduct Cournot oligopoly. It is assumed that firms have cost functions that do not change over the period of observation but that market demand can change in each period. Market prices and firm-specific production quantities are...

In this paper we address an asymmetric information problem in the fundraising industry, the fundraising problem. The problem arises from donors' lack of information about the quality of charities that solicit donations. We focus on one particular solution of this problem, certification, where an...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K open curves of identical lengths, with N K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their...