’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price …In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first-price …The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in firstprice (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which …

' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second-price … auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first-price auction …In first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding, second movers may discover the first movers …

The theoretical literature on collusion in auctions suggests that the first-price mechanism can deter the formation of … likely to affect the bidding behavior in first-price (but not second-price) auctions. We test experimentally a setup in which … theoretical analysis of our setup predicts that the first-price mechanism deters collusion. In contrast, we find the same level of …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second-price … auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first-price …We study first- and second-price private value auctions with sequential bidding where second movers may discover the …

first-price sealed-bid auction result in higher bids. We show that such behavior can be explained as a rational response to …-established ranking that the Dutch auction generates lower revenue than the first-price sealed-bid auction crucially depends on the size … biased beliefs. In Dutch auctions, the effect of a starting price, is negative. We demonstrate that the long …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …

We study a market in which k identical and indivisible objects are allocated using a uniform-price auction where n > k … observes the state. We show that there are equilibria in which the auction price is completely uninformative about the state of … there is no ex-post action, the auction price aggregates information. -- Auctions ; Large markets ; Information Aggregation …

externalities due to spiteful preferences, which have been used to explain overbidding in the second-price auction (SPA). Another … (ERA) is a first-price auction in which truthful bidding is encouraged by bonus payments. We test the robustness property …An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders' payoffs unaffected …