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A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - 2021

We introduce a general class of simplicity standards that vary the foresight abilities required of agents in extensive … matter what occurs at non-simple histories. We use our gradated approach to simplicity to provide characterizations of simple … mechanisms. While more demanding simplicity standards may reduce the flexibility of the designer in some cases, this is not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220157

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller is willing to take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087203

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013087422

A dominant strategy double clock auction with estimation‐based tâtonnement

Loertscher, Simon; Mezzetti, Claudio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 943-978

The price mechanism is fundamental to economics but difficult to reconcile with incentive compatibility and individual rationality. We introduce a double clock auction for a homogeneous good market with multidimensional private information and multiunit traders that is deficit‐free, ex post...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806306

Implementation with interdependent valuations

MacLean, Richard P.; Postlewaite, Andrew - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 923-952

It is well-known that the ability of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to implement efficient outcomes for private value choice problems does not extend to interdependent value problems. When an agent's type affects other agents' utilities, it may not be incentive compatible for him to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673132

A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design

Pycia, Marek; Troyan, Peter - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 91 (2023) 4, pp. 1495-1526

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014365474

Performance‐maximizing large contests

Olszewski, Wojciech; Siegel, Ron - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 57-88

Many sales, sports, and research contests are put in place to maximize contestants’ performance. We investigate and provide a complete characterization of the prize structures that achieve this objective in settings with many contestants. The contestants may be ex-ante asymmetric in their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159024

Subsidies, knapsack auctions and Dantzig’s greedy heuristic

Ensthaler, Ludwig; Giebe, Thomas - 2009

A budget-constrained buyer wants to purchase items from a shortlisted set. Items are differentiated by quality and sellers have private reserve prices for their items. Sellers quote prices strategically, inducing a knapsack game. The buyer's problem is to select a subset of maximal quality. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003848830

Competing with Asking Prices

Lester, Benjamin - 2016

In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986936

Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

Benkert, Jean-Michel - 2022 - This version: July 2022

The endowment and attachment effect are empirically well-documented in bilateral trade situations. Yet, the theoretical literature has so far failed to formally identify these effects. We ftll this gap by introducing expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain both effects, into the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013362215