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bargaining: union contract negotiations. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024495
The paper reports on an experiment on two-player double-auction bargaining with private values. We consider a setting with discrete two-point overlapping distributions of traders' valuations, in which there exists a fully efficient equilibrium. We show that if there are traders that behave...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011852503
Mediator proposals can accelerate agreement and increase welfare even if the mediator is entirely uninformed. We demonstrate this by adding random mediation to the Cramton (1992) bargaining model. Mediation increases welfare by pooling types, which reduces signaling costs. When mediation is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013240900
hostage negotiations, we show that the never-concede policy of governments hinges on at least five unstated assumptions that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024404
I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337007
We find that probabilistic deceit detection and cheap-talk threats enhance the fairness and honesty of a bargainer who possesses advantageous information and has the opportunity to be deceitful. In our ultimatum game, only proposers know the size of the pie. Proposers, therefore, have the option...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013003880
Rubinstein's structure. At each round of negotiations, one and only one player, exogenously determined, can make an - the - offer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524731
I consider two-person bargaining problems in which mechanism is selected at the almost ex ante stage---when there is some positive probability that players may have learned their private types---and the chosen mechanism is implemented at the interim stage. For these problems, I define almost ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854555
In the context of international bargaining, standard models predict that a shift in military power can cause preventive war because it changes the relative bargaining position between states. We find that shifts in military power are not the only cause of war under commitment problems and that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014160801
To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in which each player can buy out other players with upfront transfers. We uncover the role of an essential player in a transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922042