We conduct a novel experimental test of the Coase conjecture using subjects' private information about preferences for fairness. In an infinite horizon bargaining game, a proposer proposes a division of chips, until a responder accepts. Given private information about fairness preferences and...

I show how uncertainty about agents' future costs of delay, can lead to substantial bargaining delays when agents have reputational concerns. Reputational concerns arise because with positive probability agents are behavioral types, committed to demanding a fixed share of the surplus. In the...

A buyer has unknown valuation for a good; the seller makes all offers and has preferences for fairness; there is an infinite horizon. Without fairness preferences the Coase conjecture obtains, the object is sold almost immediately at a price equal the buyer's lowest valuation offers are frequent....

I experimentally investigate an infinitely repeated market entry game with an informed incumbent firm who knows demand and an uninformed entrant firm who does not. The uninformed firm's profits each period serve as a signal about demand, but the informed firm may signal jam the uninformed firm...

I experimentally investigate a new game that modifies the prisoner's dilemma. In this game, as opposed to the regular prisoner's dilemma, there is no tradeoff between cooperation and strategic risk (uncertainty regarding the other player's strategy) that is the leading explanation for low...

I investigate finitely repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring where both mutual effort and mutual shirking are Nash equilibria of the stage game. The treatment variable is the number of repetitions. I find that period 1 effort rates are increasing in the number of repetitions, but...