continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition …

We study assignment problems with externalities where agents have expectations about the reactions of other agents to …

We study coalition formation problems with general externalities. We prove that if expectations are not prudent a … stable coalitions structure can fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable coalition structure exists if the set of … admissible coalitions is single-lapping. This assumption also guarantees the existence of a stable and efficient coalition …

where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect … and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show that if the two workers are sufficiently complementary or if … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations …

This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in … the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …

modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second …, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which case a new coalition may be formed (reversible coalitions). Under the most … propoper advantage and a linear relationship between weights and ex post payoffs for all coalition members other than the …