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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein J. - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014047243
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Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
Dur, Robert A. J. - 2010
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147137
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2010
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003941532
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2008
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011377049
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Reciprocity and incentive pay in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Non, Jan Adrianus; Roelfsema, Hein - 2009
We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011634988
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Umsetzung der integrierten Kommunikation : Anreizsysteme zur Implementierung integrierter Kommunikationsarbeit
Boenigk, Michael - 2001 - 1. Aufl.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001539947
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How important is the type of working contract for job satisfaction of agency workers?
Pettiliot, René - 2016
contract. All these studies have in common that they treat agency workers as a homogeneous group; that is, they did not … consider the contract type agency workers hold. This paper analyzes whether differences in job satisfaction can be explained by … the contract type using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The analysis leads to three main results. First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011457842
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How important is the type of working contract for job satisfaction of agency workers?
Petilliot, René - 2016
-nent contract. All these studies have in common that they treat agency workers as a homogeneous group; that is, they did not … consider the contract type agency workers hold. This paper analyzes whether differences in job satis-faction can be explained … by the contract type using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. The analysis leads to three main results. First …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011445519
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Delegation in Long-Term Relationships
Schuette, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp C. - 2012
This paper considers the eff ects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014041476
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Delegation in Long-Term Relationships
Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp C. - 2014
This paper considers the effects of a two-period interaction on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Compared to the (repeated) one-period case, the agent's first period actions may also signal his type which in turn impacts wages...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014165946