This article deals with optimal insurance contracts in an imprecise probabilities framework. The informational asymmetry takes a particular form : agents differ not only in the objective risks they face but also in the perceptions of these risks.

We consider a model in which the agent faces two independant risks of losswith different probabilities of occurence and (possibly) different levels of potential loss. We show that it is optimal to select a deductable for the low probability event that is not larger than the optimal deductable...

This study is based on the assumption that in future, genetic testing will create a situation where people can tell whether they are disposed to certain diseases including cancer, but utilization of such genetic testing is banned for the purposes of medical examination of insurants. What, then,...

This article follows a previous study on insurance fraud in the Quebec automobile insurance industry (Dionne and Belhadji, 1996). Results from that research showed that 3 to 6,4% of all claim payments (excluding those for "glass damage only") contained fraud, representing 28 to 61 million...