This paper deals with the identification and estimation of dynamic games when players' beliefs about other players' actions are biased, i.e., beliefs do not represent the probability distribution of the actual behavior of other players conditional on the information available. First, we show...

This paper addresses a fundamental identification problem in the structural estimation of dynamic oligopoly models of market entry and exit. Using the standard datasets in existing empirical applications, three components of a firm's profit function are not separately identified: the fixed cost...

Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real world data are that such models often admit multiple equilibria and that they require strong informational assumptions. The first implies that the...

This paper addresses a fundamental identification problem in the structural estimation of dynamic oligopoly models of market entry and exit. Using the standard datasets in existing empirical applications, three components of a firm’s profit function are not separately identified: the fixed...

This paper studies the identification of structural parameters in dynamic games when we replace the assumption of Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) with weaker conditions such as rational behavior and rationalizability. The identification of players' time discount factors is of especial interest....