employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

employee’s performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager’s evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal’s scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

communicated might matter. In a controlled field experiment, we study a minimally invasive change in the communication of a well …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts … receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while rational receivers benefit from disclosure. The results hold …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …