This is a survey of the economic principles that underlie antitrust law and how those principles relate to competition policy. We address four core subject areas: market power, collusion, mergers between competitors, and monopolization. In each area, we select the most relevant portions of...

Distribution cartels in the automotive sector used to be frequently dismantled and sanctioned by the European Commission and the EU Courts still some 15 years ago. In recent years, however, only a few cases have been reported at the national level of EU Member States. Is it because the...

In The Antitrust Paradox, Robert Bork discusses policy responses to naked and ancillary price fixing as well as vertical restraints. Empirical research finds that vertical restraints are generally welfare-enhancing. We examine cartels that used vertical restraints to support collusion. We find...

This paper argues that empirical economic analysis in court proceedings is subject to important economic and legal restrictions, cumulating in a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and practicality. We draw lessons from two influential German court cases - the paper wholesaler cartel decision...

This paper argues that empirical economic analysis in court proceedings is subject to important economic and legal restrictions, culminating in a fundamental trade-off between accuracy and practicality. We draw lessons from two influential German court cases - the paper wholesaler cartel...

Damage compensation claims in case of cartels are supposed to increase deterrence, compensate losses and increase efficiency. I show that such claims can instead have adverse effects: If suppliers or buyers of cartelists are compensated in proportion to the profits lost due to the cartel,...

This paper develops a model that formalizes several connections between mergers, collusion and competition policy. In equilibrium, firms may merge to make collusion sustainable when it cannot be sustained with the original set of firms. A rise in the probability of detecting and prosecuting...

Few would deny that the European Commission has an impressive track record with respect to anti-cartel enforcement. At present, however, a lacuna exists with respect to its enforcement powers: it cannot to impose fines on natural persons who are responsible for their companies’ cartel...

Die deutsche Version des Papers ist abrufbar unter: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3337826So far, leniency programmes have been widely used to combat cartels. A company participating in the cartel gets a reduction of its fine for the initial notification of the Antitrust Authorities (AA). The...

In order to fully execute rights of defense, parties within a cartel investigation should be allowed to see the extent of the investigation file in an open and transparent manner, subject to the limit that the confidential information of undertakings must be respected and their confidentiality...