benefit – and incorporates it into the framework of evolutionary game theory that underpins the social learning literature. An …

cooperative game. Unlike its predecessors in the evolution/learning literature, this is achieved without assumptions of convexity …

estimated EWA learning models which suffered from overfitting. Subjects modified their strategies in the direction of better … response as calculated from CA simulations of various learning models, albeit not perfectly. Examples include the observation …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic …" or that "could learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order …

It is known that there are uncoupled learning heuristics leading to Nash equilibrium in all finite games. Why should … players use such learning heuristics and where could they come from? We show that there is no uncoupled learning heuristic … that could "learn itself". Rather, a player has an incentive to strategically teach such a learning opponent in order to …

learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the …

simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …

simultaneously. We propose a decentralized, completely uncoupled learning process in such environments that leads to stable and … sell-side). This simple and intuitive learning process implements core allocations even though agents have no knowledge of …