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A pragmatic multi-method investigation of discrepant technological events : coping, attributions, and 'accidental' learning
Figl, Kathrin; Recker, Jan - In: Information & management : the internat. journal of … 53 (2016) 6, pp. 787-802
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576966
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Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 341-367
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599374
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Learning (not) to yield: An experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavior
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; … - In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics … 47 (2013) C, pp. 47-54
toward equal, sharing. Here, we tested the hypothesis that it is regret—both material and strategic—which determines, how … the median outcomes in the population. We find that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play, in particular of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011051797
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Regret testing: learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 3, pp. 341-367
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005812747
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Regret in auctions: theory and evidence
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard; Katok, Elena - In: Economic Theory 33 (2007) 1, pp. 81-101
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178713
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Learning (Not) To Yield: An Experimental Study of Evolving Ultimatum Game Behavior
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
toward equal sharing. Here we tested the hypothesis that it is regret-both material and strategic-which determines how … show that regret is a good predictor of the dynamics of play. Specifically, we will turn to the dynamics that unfold when …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008782796
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Learning and affect following near-miss outcomes in simulated gambling
Clark, Luke; Liu, Rui; McKavanagh, Rebecca; Garrett, Alice - In: Journal of behavioral decision making 26 (2013) 5, pp. 442-450
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227133
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Learning (not) to yield : an experimental study of evolving ultimatum game behavior
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Hertwig, Ralph; … - In: The journal of socio-economics 47 (2013), pp. 47-54
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010489955
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Regret testing : learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent
Foster, Dean P.; Young, H. Peyton - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 1 (2006) 3, pp. 341-367
A learning rule is uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's payoffs. It is radically uncoupled if a player does not condition his strategy on the opponent's actions or payoffs. We demonstrate a family of simple, radically uncoupled learning rules whose...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702986
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Learning and dynamic choices under uncertainty : from weighted regret and rejoice to expected utility
Zagonari, Fabio - 2016
behavioural models suggested by psychology (i.e., weighted probabilities applied to regret and rejoice theory), and by updating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703316