How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...

In the face of demand uncertainty, a monopolist can observe sales as a controlled reaction to its price and advertising so as to improve the choice of this marketing mix in the future. Furthermore, to upgrade its knowledge about demand the firm has the option to invest in external market...

Consumers’ purchase decisions can be influenced by others’ opinions, i.e., word-of-mouth (WOM), and/or others’ actions, i.e., observational learning. While information technologies are creating increasing opportunities for firms to facilitate/manage these two types of social interaction,...

Strategic learning self-efficacy reflects the confidence of managers in their ability to learn from the outcomes of past strategic decisions and apply that knowledge to new decisions. This research examines the relationship between strategic learning self-efficacy and a firm's industry-adjusted...

This article estimates a model of optimal search where consumers learn the distribution of gasoline prices during their driving trips. Our estimation incorporates traffic information and leverages the ordered search environment to recover parameters of the search and learning process using only...

We study the intergenerational accumulation of knowledge in an infinite-horizon model of communication. Each in a sequence of players receives an informative but imperfect signal of the once-and-for-all realization of an unobserved state. The state affects all players' preferences over present...

We study a sequential social learning model where agents privately acquire information by costly search. Search costs of agents are private to them, and are independently and identically distributed. We show that asymptotic learning occurs if and only if search costs are not bounded away from...