This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We show that continuous …/T , regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not possess the fictitious …-play property. As an extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted potential …

This paper studies fictitious play in networks of noncooperative two-person games. We show that continuous … convergence is 1/T, regardless of the size of the network. In contrast, arbitrary n-person zero-sum games with bilinear payoff … functions do not possess the continuous-time fictitious-play property. As extensions, we consider networks in which each …

The novelty of our model is to combine models of collective action on networks with models of social learning. Agents … are connected according to an undirected graph, the social network, and have the choice between two actions: either to … network. (2) Average inclination governs collective adoption behavior. (3) Initial inclinations determine the critical mass of …

We report the findings of experiments designed to study how people learn in network games. Network games offer new … opportunities to identify learning rules, since on networks (compared to, e.g., random matching) more rules differ in terms of their … find that learning depends on network position. Participants in more complex environments (with more network neighbors …

social network - can influence our choices. These choices in turn influence the generation of new information and shape … future choices. These considerations motivate a rich research programme on how social networks shape individual and …

The paper analyzes a dynamic model of rational strategic learning in a network. It complements existing literature by … network. We show that the delay in information transmission caused by incomplete network structures may induce players to … increase own experimentation efforts. As a consequence a complete network can fail to be optimal even if there are no costs for …

This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as … the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are … robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within …