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Margaria, Chiara - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 20 (2025) 2, pp. 623-665

I study the efficient design of a queue to dynamically allocate a scarce resource to long‐lived agents. Agents can be served multiple times, and their valuations fluctuate over time with some persistence. Each agent privately learns whether his prevailing valuation is high or low only when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015415277

Chapter 27 Market Design Using Agent-Based Models

Marks, Robert - In: Handbook of computational economics : volume 2, …, (pp. 1339-1380). 2006

markets in silico, using electricity markets and on-line double auctions as illustrations. A monopoly sealed-bid auction is …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024378

Designing stable mechanisms for economic environments

Healy, Paul J.; Mathevet, Laurent - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 3, pp. 609-661

We study the design of mechanisms that implement Lindahl or Walrasian allocations and whose Nash equilibria are dynamically stable for a wide class of adaptive dynamics. We argue that supermodularity is not a desirable stability criterion in this mechanism design context, focusing instead on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011689095

Consumer-optimal information design

Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2017

In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788

Internet Auctions With Artificial Adaptive Agents : A Study on Market Design

Duffy, John - 2015

Many internet auction sites implement ascending-bid, second-price auctions. Empirically, last minute or quot …;latequot; bidding is frequently observed in quot;hard-closequot; but not in quot;soft-closequot; versions of these auctions. In this … other findings, we observe that hard-close auctions raise less revenue than soft-close auctions. We also investigate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012707961

Supermodular mechanism design

Mathevet, Laurent A. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 5 (2010) 3, pp. 403-443

This paper introduces a mechanism design approach that allows dealing with the multiple equilibrium problem, using mechanisms that are robust to bounded rationality. This approach is a tool for constructing supermodular mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms that induce games with strategic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695244

Optimal refund mechanism

Lyu, Qianjun - 2022

This paper studies the optimal refund mechanism when an uninformed buyer can privately acquire information about his valuation over time. In principle, a refund mechanism can specify the odds that the seller requires the product returned while issuing a (partial) refund, which we call stochastic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013493000

Learning in online advertising

Choi, W. Jason; Sayedi, Amin - In: Marketing science 38 (2019) 4, pp. 584-608

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012059797

An assessment of strategies for choosing between competitive marketplaces

Miller, Timothy; Niu, Jinzhong - In: Electronic commerce research and applications 11 (2012) 1/6, pp. 14-23

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009730295

Cross-Game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Giebe, Thomas; Kocher, Martin; Schudy, Simeon; … - 2021

Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We …. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693