Similar Search Results

Malamud, Semyon; Schrimpf, Andreas - 2021 - This version: October 17, 2021

How should an agent (the sender) observing multi-dimensional data (the state vector) persuade another agent to take the desired action? We show that it is always optimal for the sender to perform a (non-linear) dimension reduction by projecting the state vector onto a lower-dimensional object...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012799529

Persuading while learning

Arieli, Itai; Babichenko, Yakov; Shaiderman, Dima; Shi, … - 2025

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015179471

Bayesian persuasion with optimal learning

Liao, Xiaoye - In: Journal of mathematical economics 97 (2021), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013183690

Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning

Nikandrova, Arina; Pancs, Romans - In: Journal of economic theory 171 (2017), pp. 174-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011777006

Consumer-optimal information design

Wangenheim, Jonas von - 2017

In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762788

Communication under Ambiguity

Dominiak, Adam; Gersbach, Hans - 2024

We study communication in ambiguous environments. Agents communicate individual decisions sequentially. Based on the …, the decisions differ no matter how long the communication lasts. Such persistent disagreements are precluded in Bayesian … frameworks endowed with a common prior. When communication is private and nobody is excluded from it, we show that ambiguity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014484275