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Information design in coalition formation games

Vosooghi, Sareh - 2017

information to agents, who consider joining a coalition. The agents' actions can cause harm by contributing to a public bad. The … coalition size, as a function of beliefs of agents, is an endogenous variable, induced by the information sender. The optimal … information mechanism from the general set of public information mechanisms, in coalition formation games is derived. I also apply …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011660390

Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks

Förster, Manuel - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 1, pp. 253-295

We develop a dynamic framework of strategic information transmission through cheap talk in a social network. Privately informed agents have different preferences about the action to be implemented by each agent and repeatedly communicate with their neighbors in the network. We first characterize...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012020319

Voluntary Information Acquisition in an Asymmetric-Information Game : Comparing Learning Theories in the Laboratory

Wen, Yuanji - 2018

This paper uses an experimental design of voluntary information acquisition to assess the information assumptions of different learning models. The design is implemented in two-stage asymmetric-information games. Subjects' information-seeking behavior reveals that they tend to choose certain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012938179

Learning from failures : optimal contract for experimentation and production

Khalil, Fahad; Lawarrée, Jacques; Rodivilov, Alexander - 2018

Before embarking on a project, a principal must often rely on an agent to learn about its profitability. We model this learning as a two-armed bandit problem and highlight the interaction between learning (experimentation) and production. We derive the optimal contract for both experimentation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011926023

Reputation building with endogenous speed of learning

Pei, Harry - 2019

I study reputation models in which information about the long-run player's past behavior is dispersed among short-run players. I identify two challenges to reputation building when such information is aggregated via the short-run players' actions. First, when the long-run player's action can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012169393

A comparison of endogenous and exogenous timing in a social learning experiment

Meub, Lukas; Proeger, Till; Hüning, Hendrik - 2013

This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and endogenous ordering of decisions and a continuous action space. Given that individuals regularly fail to apply rational timing, we refrain from implementing optimal timing of decisions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009779323

Sequential Learning under Informational Ambiguity

Chen, Jaden Yang - 2020

This paper studies a sequential learning problem where individuals are ambiguous about other people's signal structures. It finds that ambiguity has an important impact on social learning and provides new insights on the mechanism behind herding behavior. This paper claims that whether an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846991

Public statistics and private experience : varying feedback information in a take-or-pass game

Danz, David; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe - 2015

We study how subjects in an experiment use different forms of public information about their opponents' past behavior. In the absence of public information, subjects appear to use rather detailed statistics summarizing their private experiences. If they have additional public information, they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011437784

Observational learning in large anonymous games

Monzón, Ignacio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 2, pp. 403-435

I present a model of observational learning with payoff interdependence. Agents, ordered in a sequence, receive private signals about an uncertain state of the world and sample previous actions. Unlike in standard models of observational learning, an agent's payoff depends both on the state and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022731

Belief formation in a signalling game without common prior : an experiment

Possajennikov, Alexandre - 2012

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526