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Modelling contributions in public good games with punishment

Lee-Penagos, Alejandro - 2016

: that altruistic punishment can sustain cooperation. This paper extends their model in order to explain such recent findings …. It focuses on fear of punishment, not punishment itself, as the key mechanism to sustain contributions to the public good … differs, on average, in less than 5% compared to relevant experiments with punishment in the lab. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011569202

Play it again : partner choice, reputation building and learning in restarting, finitely-repeated dilemma games

Kamei, Kenju; Putterman, Louis G. - 2013

Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010126752

Learning in Repeated Public Goods Games - A Meta Analysis

Cotla, Chenna Reddy - 2018

I examine the generalizability of a broad range of prominent learning models in explaining contribution patterns in repeated linear public goods games. Experimental data from twelve previously published papers are considered in testing several learning models in terms of how accurately they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911924

Strategic experimentation : the case of poisson bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2002

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410236

Strategic experimentation with exponential bandits

Cripps, Martin; Keller, Godfrey; Rady, Sven - 2003 - This version: July 9, 2003

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440933

The evolution of sanctioning institutions : an experimental approach to the social contract

Zhang, Boyu; Li, Cong; De Silva, Hannelore; Bednarik, Peter - In: Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic … 17 (2014) 2, pp. 285-303

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010411226

Bandits in the lab

Hoelzemann, Johannes; Klein, Nicolas Alexandre - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 12 (2021) 3, pp. 1021-1051

We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598548

Confusion and reinforcement learning in experimental public goods games

Bayer, Ralph-C.; Renner, Elke; Sausgruber, Rupert - 2009

We use a limited information environment to mimic the state of confusion in an experimental, repeated public goods game. The results show that reinforcement learning leads to dynamics similar to those observed in standard public goods games. However, closer inspection shows that individual decay...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011343917

Equilibrium Play and Learning in a Stochastic Public Goods Experiment

Banerjee, Priyodorshi - 2012

The public goods problem or the “tragedy of the commons,” (Hardin, 1968) either viewed as a problem of extraction or that of contribution has had a rich history in Economics and indeed in other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology and Political Science. Our research examines free...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107187

Play it Again : Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

Kamei, Kenju - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013076291