Using instrumental variables, we find that having more antitakeover provisions is not only more likely to prevent a bid but also more likely to cause management resistance in the event of not doing so. The deterrent effect is likely to be decreasing in the cost to rival bidders of acquiring...

We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors. Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid to the top...

Are the professional networks of corporate directors valuable? More connected directors may have better information and more influence, which can increase firm value. However, these directors may also be busy or spread value-decreasing practices. To separate the effect of director networks on...

We present an introductory regulatory and empirical analysis of executive compensation in listed companies in India.Our descriptive overview of levels and trends leads to several interesting conclusions. First, executive pay in the echelon representing the largest firms is several times greater...