In a competitive environment, switching costs have two eects. First, they increase the market power of a seller with locked-in customers. Second, they increase competition for new customers. I provide conditions under which switching costs decrease or increase equilibrium prices. Taken together,...

We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of rm dominance on incentives for Ramp;D. An increase in firm dominance, whichwe measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for Ramp;D. These changes inuence...

We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dominance on incentives for Ramp;D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for Ramp;D. These changes...

We provide a simple framework to analyze the effect of firm dominance on incentives for Ramp;D. An increase in firm dominance, which we measure by a premium in consumer valuation, increases the dominant firm's incentives and decreases the rival firm's incentives for Ramp;D. These changes...

I revisit the relation between aftermarket power and basic market competition. I consider an infinite period model with overlapping consumers: in each period, one consumer is born and joins one of the existing installed bases, then aftermarket payoffs are received by sellers and consumers, then...