We study a matching model with salaries in which firms face budget constraints. Due to budget constraints, the existence of a stable matching is not guaranteed. We show that if workers are homogeneous, from the firms' point of view, then a weak stable matching always exists; furthermore, when a...

We study a one-to-one two-sided matching market in which each man has a common value for all women and a private value specific to each woman. We introduce a new mechanism, called a proposing mechanism, which is a novel interpretation of the deferred acceptance mechanism. We show that these...

Each year, over a hundred thousand defendants who are too poor to pay for a lawyer are assigned counsel. Existing procedures for making such assignments are essentially random and have been criticized for giving indigent defendants no say in choosing the counsel they are assigned to. In this...

Stable mechanisms are not immune to manipulation in matching markets; however, they work well in practice. We study the college admission problem where colleges have completely heterogeneous preferences and can under-report their capacities. Assuming there is a continuum of students, we use a...