Showing 1 - 10 of 2,065
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
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In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …. -- Fixed and Random Matching ; Incomplete Information ; Ex-Post Regret Learning ; Nash Equilibrium ; Ex-Post Equilibrium … ; Minimax Regret Equilibrium ; Second-Price Auction ; First-Price Auction ; Bertrand Duopoly …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688967
In contexts in which players have no priors, we analyze a learning process based on ex-post regret as a guide to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142432
We analyze a symmetric n-firm Cournot oligopoly with a heterogeneous population of optimizers and imitators. Imitators mimic the output decision of the most successful firms of the previous round à la Vega-Redondo (1997). Optimizers play a myopic best response to the opponents' previous output....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366551
number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious … play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those … and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379095
Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535526
We experimentally implement a dynamic public-good problem, where the public good in question is the dynamically evolving information about agents' common state of the world. Subjects' behavior is consistent with free-riding because of strategic concerns. We also find that subjects adopt more...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598548
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