employee's performance was poor. The justification assures the employee that the manager has not distorted the evaluation …? Suppose a manager's evaluation is private information. Justifying her evaluation is costly but limits the principal's scope … for distorting her evaluation of the employee. I show that the manager justifies her evaluation if and only if the …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic channel under which such disclosure often leads to more biased messages. This hurts … receivers who are naive or delegate their choice while rational receivers benefit from disclosure. The results hold …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interests on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … naive or delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative, but at the same … delegating receivers; disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of the …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …

of projects. The agent is biased in favor of implementation and no credible communication is possible in a one …-shot setting. In a repeated setting, the fear of losing future influence can sustain informative communication, but the agent …

investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve … sophistication. Imposing precise disclosure leads to more easily interpretable messages, but results in fewer sender types disclosing … at all. Since non- disclosure also systematically misleads naive receivers, the welfare implications of imposing …

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and …

This paper studies the effect of disclosing conflicts of interest on strategic communication when the sender has lying … costs. I present a simple economic mechanism under which such disclosure often leads to more informative and, at the same … or delegating receivers. Disclosure is thus not a Pareto-improvement among receivers. I identify general conditions of …