By shrinking the available menu of loan contracts, asymmetric information can result in two types of nonprice rationing in credit markets. The first is conventional quantity rationing. The second is ‘risk rationing.’ Risk rationed agents are able to borrow, but only under relatively high...

Recent theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that risk (especially covariant risk that is correlated across producers) may discourage both the supply of agricultural credit and the willingness of small holders to utilize available credit and enjoy the higher expected incomes credit could...

Price risk in a mathematical programming framework has been confined for a long time to a constant risk aversion specification originally introduced by Freund in 1956. This paper extends the treatment of risk in a mathematical programming framework along the lines suggested by Meyer (1987) who...

This paper contains a substantial revision of a previous paper with the same title.

This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and risk preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which competitive, risk neutral lenders offer contracts to risk averse agents who...

The effective design and implementation of interventions that reduce vulnerability and poverty require a solid understanding of underlying poverty dynamics and associated behavioral responses. Stochastic and dynamic benefit streams can make it difficult for the poor to learn the value of such...