We construct a real options signaling game model to analyze the impact of asymmetric information on the dynamic acquisition decision made by the aggressive acquirer firm and passive target firm in the takeover terms and timing. The target firm is assumed to have partial information on the...

We develop the real option signaling games models of equity financing of a risky project under asymmetric information, where the firm quality is known to the firm management but not outside investors. Unlike the usual assumption of perpetuity of investment, we assume that the time window of the...

In this study, we develop a static signaling game model to examine the problem of a firm raising funds externally to finance an investment project when there is an information asymmetry between the firm and its outside investors, and the life-span of the investment project is very short....

We analyze the real option signaling game models of debt financing of a risky project under information asymmetry, where the firm quality is only known to the firm management but not outsiders. The firm decides on the optimal investment timing of the risky project that requires upfront fixed...