auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the … standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders … revenue decomposition restores revenue equivalence between different auction designs, provided that the same information about …

-riding by uninformed bidders. We further show that the Linkage Principle can fail to hold even in a pure first-price auction …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders' equilibrium …

one sender case, we show that correlation unambiguously tightens the existence conditions for a truth-telling equilibrium …. We then generalize the model to an arbitrary number of senders, and we find that, in this case, the effect of correlation … on the incentives to report information truthfully is non monotone, and correlation may discipline senders equilibrium …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in firstprice auctions. …

signal’s informativeness, the all-pay auction raises lower revenue than the second-price auction, whereas the revenue ranking … between the all-pay and the first-price auction is ambiguous …

learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …

heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …