We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two LECs) and a third network (e.g., an IXC) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and transit calls to the other LEC via the first LEC's...

We examine the interaction between two interconnected networks (e.g., two local exchange carriers (LECs)) and a third network (e.g., an interexchange carrier (IXC)) seeking access to their customer base. The IXC could either interconnect with both LECs or interconnect with only one LEC and...

We characterize the features of collusion involving retailers and their supplier, who engage in secret vertical contracts and all equally care about future profits (“vertical collusion”). We show such collusion is easier to sustain than collusion among retailers. The supplier pays retailers...

An injurer's activity often exposes multiple victims to the risk of harm. We show that under negligence, the tort system's dominant regime, such victims face a collective-action problem in choosing their activity levels. An increase in one victim's activity level confers a positive externality...

The article reviews loyalty rebates, target rebates, exclusive dealing, and bundling, and argues that these are analogous practices that deserve similar competitive analyses and rules. In particular, in the case of all of these practices, at least some marginal units are typically sold below...

The aim of this paper is to provide a coherent approach to the prohibition of excessive pricing by dominant firms as an antitrust violation. It first highlights the rationale for the prohibition, and shows that the prohibition exists and is also enforced in many countries. It then shows why...

Conventional wisdom in law and economics has long been that negligence-based regimes induce optimal care but encourage excessive activity. This paper demonstrates that when behavior involves multiple victims or injurers, negligence-based regimes can create a collective action problem which...