We consider a network game based on matching pennies with two types of agents, conformists and rebels. Conformists prefer to match the action taken by the majority of her neighbors while rebels like to match the minority. We investigate the simultaneous best response dynamic focusing on the...

Horizontal firms frequently pool their resources together and operate in a collective way to fully utilize the economies of scale and scope, and how to share the obtained profit is a central problem. A standard approach for studying this problem is to represent it as a set function and apply the...

Gagnon and Goyal (2017) develop an elegant model to understand the interaction between community and markets. One key argument is that, among others, whether markets and social ties are substitutes or complements plays a decisive role: markets undermine social ties in the case of substitutes and...

We study the Stackleberg variant of the repeated Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (SPD for short). The game goes in two stages, and the two players, the leader and the follower, are asymmetric in both stages. In the first stage of the game, the leader chooses a strategy (for the repeated SPD of...

We analyze the evolution of fashion based on a network game model. Each agent in this model is either a conformist or a rebel. A conformist prefers to take the action most common among her neighboring agents, whereas a rebel prefers the opposite. When there is only one type of agent, the model...