We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, society comprises two groups who compete in every period for political power, i.e. the right to allocate economic resources between the groups. Individuals can move from one group to another at a cost:...

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate societys resources, and we allow for costly intergroup mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate society's resources, and we allow for costly inter-group mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject and...

If a government has ability and willingness to redistribute the surplus created by an external investor, why do we still observe resistance to such investment, sometimes in the form of destruction of productive assets? And how does such destructive action affect a government's...

I study a model of electoral competition where both economic policy and politicians' effort affect voters' payoff. If voters cannot distinguish the effect of policy and effort, politicians acquire an implicit incentive to exert effort. This incentive can last through every period in an...

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The industry consists of a polluting firm with private information about its production technology. Implementing a transfer-based regulation policy requires the government to make...