When considering electoral campaigns, candidates receiving contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding. To offset this unpopularity effect, politicians may either demand more money for campaign...

When considering electoral campaigns, those candidates that receive contributions from relatively unpopular industries should be regarded less favorably by voters that have information on the sources of funding. To offset this unpopularity effect, politicians may either demand more money for...

This paper studies the impact of collective reputation on the reporting strategy of experts that face conflicts of interest. The framework we propose applies to different settings involving decision makers that rely on experts for making informed decisions, in particular we consider sell-side...

Decision makers often face uncertainty both about the ability and the integrity of their advisors. If an expert is sufficiently concerned about establishing a reputation for being skilled and unbiased, she may truthfully report her private information about the decision-relevant state. However,...

We analyze a model of cheap talk in which an expert that faces a conflict of interest with a decision maker is concerned about establishing a reputation for having accurate information. In this environment, the incentive of the expert to establish a reputation for competence has a non-monotonic...

We study individual behaviour in a repeated linear public good experiment in which, in each period, subjects are required to contribute a minimum level and face a certain probability to be audited. Audited subjects who contribute less than the minimum level are convicted to pay the difference...