We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non-answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from...

We construct a novel measure of disclosure choice by firms. Our measure is computed using linguistic analysis of conference calls to identify whether a manager's response to an analyst question is a “non-answer.” Using our measure, about 11% of analyst questions elicit non-answers from...

Conference presentations differ from other voluntary disclosures in that the audience for the disclosure is co-located with managers in a well-defined physical and social setting, or “disclosure milieu.” The milieu affects the degree to which conference participants can update their prior...

This paper examines when information asymmetry among investors affects the cost of capital in excess of standard risk factors. When equity markets are perfectly competitive, information asymmetry has no separate effect on the cost of capital. When markets are imperfect, information asymmetry can...

“Measurement error biases against [finding results]” is an often-repeated phrase used to dismiss validity threats arising from measurement error. As a general rule, this phrase is false. We provide examples of commonly encountered circumstances where the variable of interest is...

Several recent empirical papers assert that the decision to disclose an earnings forecast shortly before the actual earnings announcement reveals only short-term information and is therefore unlikely to entail proprietary costs. Using a simple dynamic model of voluntary disclosure, we show that...