Similar Search Results - EconBiz

Notions of anonymity for object assignment : impossibility theorems

Kondo, Hikaru; Serizawa, Shigehiro - 2015

We search for impartiality in the allocation of objects when monetary transfers are not possible. Our main focus is anonymity. The standard definition requires that if agents' names are permuted, their assignments should be permuted in the same way. Since no rule satisfies this definition in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487558

Strategy-proof, individually rational and symmetric social choice function for discrete public good economies

Serizawa, Shigehiro - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000909483

Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economics

Serizawa, Shigehiro - 1998

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000990139

Power of voters and domain of preferences where voting by committees is strategy-proof

Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Journal of economic theory 67 (1995) 2, pp. 599-608

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001192432

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies

Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 7 (1996) 3, pp. 501-512

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001200273

Inefficiency of strategy-proof rules for pure exchange economies

Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Journal of economic theory 106 (2002) 2, pp. 219-241

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001721392

Pairwise strategy-proofness and self-enforcing manipulation

Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Social choice and welfare 26 (2006) 2, pp. 305-331

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003347871

Maximal domain for strategy-proof rules with one public good

Berga Colom, Dolors; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Journal of economic theory 90 (2000) 1, pp. 39-61

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001448186

Strategy-proof and individually rational social choice functions for public good economies: a note

Deb, Rajat; Ohseto, Shinji - In: Economic theory : official journal of the Society for … 14 (1999) 3, pp. 685-689

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001455344

Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges

Barberà, Salvador; Massó, Jordi; Serizawa, Shigehiro - In: Social organization and mechanism design : …, (pp. 73-92). 1999

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001462982

A service of the