The aim of this paper is to analyse what does it happen when we introduce “violence”, threats and self-help, into economic models. This will be done considering the alternative between a market or a political allocation. The conclusions will be: a) That under standard assumptions there is no...

This 2 pages paper shows that, if we properly understand the working of markets without transaction costs, the social utility function associated with them, assumes the form of a mathematical singularity and then that there will be no predictable behavior of this function

In this essay the Author traces back the modern standard theory of economic rationality to the theological backgrond of the theory of Angels as rational decision makers developed by Christian Scholastics.His main conclusion is that there is an identifiable theological background of modern...

The recent wave of behavioral economics has led some theorists to advocate the possibility of “libertarian paternalism,” in which regulators designing institutions permit significant individual choice but nonetheless use default rules to “nudge” cognitively biased individuals toward...

This article responds to a set of well-known challenges to empirical research on formal institutions in comparative politics. We focus on the case of written constitutions and discuss the scholarly utility of studying such documents in the face of four analytic and theoretical challenges. Each...

This chapter reviews the literature on public choice theory and constitutional design, focusing in particular on the sub-discipline of constitutional political economy. The basic framework of constitutional political economy has been in place for several decades and has produced some important...