We examine whether firms’ political hedging activities are effective at mitigating political risk. Focusing on the risk induced by partisan politics, we measure political hedging as the degree to which firms’ political connections are balanced across Republican and Democratic candidates. We...

Materialization of new markets results in variations in company valuations due to information asymmetry compounded with uncertainty. This information asymmetry can lead to adverse selection and moral hazard. However, this information asymmetry can be reduced, to a certain extent, through...

Theory suggests that information asymmetry between supplier and customer firms exacerbates the holdup problem. We investigate if an auditor common to the supplier and customer firm improves information flows leading to reduction in the holdup problem. Consistent with this notion, we find that...

We examine whether it is incentives or standards that determine firms' financial reporting quality using a natural experiment in Taiwan. Before 2001, Taiwan's Company Act required private firms with capital levels exceeding a certain threshold to file and publish audited financial statements....