In this paper, we study a large class of multi-contestant multi-battle resource allocation contests, where contestants can be asymmetric in terms of both resource budgets and battle valuations, battles can be heterogeneous in terms of both contest success functions and battle valuations, and the...

The choice of payment terms has increasingly become more important in determining the success of exporting transactions. While exporters often use Open Account (OA) terms to secure international contracts and to expand export levels, these terms in turn make them face more non-payment risks. In...

We present a robust model of speculative bubbles by introducing loss-averse reference-dependent preferences by Koszegi and Rabin (2006) into the framework of Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993), where in equilibrium, asymmetrically-informed rational investors buy overvalued assets, hoping to...

Facing lengthening lifespans and economic concerns, workers and governments are increasingly considering the possibility of delayed retirement ages. However, the postponement of retirement may not be universally feasible, since not all workers may be willing and able to continue working past the...

How does information asymmetry between firms regarding the quality (ability) of workers, determine the distribution of workers' qualities in those firms? We build a game theoretic model of information asymmetry between 2 representative firms competing in the labor market for labor inputs. In the...

Collective knowledge is significantly affected by information about others’ viewpoints. However, under what conditions does the “wisdom of crowds” help versus harm knowledge of factual information? In this experiment, we present subjects with the task of answering 50 factual true or false...

The effects of asymmetric information are often difficult to detect empirically, such as in insurance settings. We show that allowing for reference-dependent preferences can assist with this empirical challenge. Using detailed auto insurance claims data, we show that policyholders exhibit...

How can a government regulate an existing transportation monopoly based on features of the transport market and route structures? We analyze the government's regulatory problem from the perspective of two possible strategies: partially publicizing the existing monopolist, and entering the...