We model a financial market where privately informed investors trade in a limit order book monitored by professional liquidity providers. Price competition between informed limit order submitters and professional market makers allows us to capture tradeoffs between informed limit and market...

We develop a tractable model of a limit order market where informed and liquidity investors compete with a professional liquidity provider who has a monitoring advantage. We apply our model to study the impact of exogenous transaction costs and investor patience on trading activity and market...

In financial markets, clients entrust their capital and data to financial infrastructure providers who are vulnerable to breaches. We develop a model in which infrastructure providers compete to provide secure and efficient client services, in the presence of a cyber-attacker. In equilibrium,...

Non-bank financial institutions, such as principal-trading firms and hedge funds, increasingly compete with bank-owned dealers in fixed-income markets. Some market participants worry that if non-bank financial institutions push out established bank dealers, liquidity will become unreliable...

Financial services are delivered almost exclusively online and cyber attackers have taken notice. We develop a principal-agent model with fee-paying clients who delegate security decisions to financial platforms that are subject to cyber attacks that steal data or assets. We derive testable...

Over the last decade, an increasing portion of U.S. equity trading volume has been executed away from public exchanges. A common form of this off-exchange trading is internalization, a practice whereby a brokerage fills a client's order from its own inventory. I develop a model to study the...