We present a model that helps explain why only few blockholders seek board representation despite little direct costs. In the model, inefficiently few blockholders take a board seat because it signals adverse information to outside investors, lowering trading profits. However, once taken, board...

According to existing theories, short-term creditors promote corporate governance by responding quickly to new information. I show that this very feature of short-term debt can also hurt corporate governance, as it can undermine information revelation in financial markets. In particular,...

We develop a theory of digital ecosystems built on the premise that a multi-market firm can steer users it has in one market toward its products in other markets. Due to this “cross-market leverage,” a leader in an “access-point” market (where users begin their online journeys) derives a...

Economic models and experiments frequently use lotteries with only a few outcomes. We provide a comprehensive analysis of the correlation between such lotteries as well as their dependence structure more generally. We fully characterize the joint distribution of two binary lotteries via their...

We develop a model of digital ecosystems based on the assumption that a multimarket firm can use a sale in or data from one market to steer users toward its products in other markets. Due to this "cross-market leverage," a market leader at an "access point" (where users begin their online...