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On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

Allouch, Nizar; Wooders, Myrna Holtz - 2014

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889

Core stability and core-like solutions for three-sided assignment games

Atay, Ata; Núñez, Marina - 2018

In this paper, we study different notions of stability for three-sided assignment games. Since the core may be empty in …-Morgenstern stable sets. The dominant diagonal property is necessary for the core to be a stable set, and also sufficient in the case … of the extended cores of all μ-compatible subgames, for a given optimal matching μ, is the core with respect to those …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012011087

Chapter 56 Values of games with infinitely many players

Neyman, Abraham - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2121-2167). 2002

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are models of interactions with many players. Often most of the players are individually insignificant, and are effective in the game only via coalitions. At the same time there may...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024489

Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an N-Person Game

Sun, Ning; Trockel, Walter; Yang, Zaifu - 2004

coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and … only if the completion of the game is balanced. The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the …In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068636

Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition

Chen, Bo - 2013

We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642