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Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv - 2001

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318986

An exact non-cooperative support for the sequential Raiffa solution

Trockel, Walter - 2009

is provided for subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, it is indicated how these results can be extended to implementation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272572

On non-cooperative foundation and implementation of the Nash solution in subgame perfect equilibrium via Rubinstein's game

Duman, Papatya; Trockel, Walter - 2016

interpreted as a mechanism theoretical implementation of the Nash solution. Our results in the present paper provide exact non … of the above mentioned support results, including our present ones, with mechanism theoretic implementation in (weakly … implementation can hardly be found except in very rare cases of extremely restricted domains of players' preferences. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011412680

Sixty-seven years of the Nash program : time for retirement?

Serrano, Roberto - In: SERIEs : Journal of the Spanish Economic Association 12 (2021) 1, pp. 35-48

The Nash program is an important research agenda initiated in Nash (Econometrica 21:128-140, 1953) in order to bridge the gap between the noncooperative and cooperative counterparts of game theory. The program is thus turning sixty-seven years old, but I will argue it is not ready for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012503895

Harsanyi power solutions for graph-restricted games

Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Pruzhansky, … - 2004

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff distributions (possibly empty or consisting of a unique element) to every...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011338005

A comparison of the average prekernel and the prekernel

Serrano, Roberto; Shimomura, Ken-ichi - 2001

We propose positive and normative foundations for the average prekernel of NTU games, and compare them with the existing ones for the prekernel. In our non-cooperative analysis, the average prekernel is understood as the equilibrium payoffs of a game where each player faces the possibility of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010318958

Contracting with Externalities and Outside Options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando - 2004

This paper proposes a model of multilateral contracting where players are engaged in two parallel interactions: they dynamically form coalitions and play a repeated normal form game with temporary and permanent decisions. This formulation encompasses many economic models with externalities and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011324948

Proportional payoffs in majority games

Montero, Maria - 2008

This paper extends the Baron-Ferejohn model of legislative bargaining to general weighted majority games with two modifications: first, payoff division can only be agreed upon after the coalition has formed (two-stage bargaining); second, negotiations in the coalition can break down, in which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010290526

Stable demands and bargaining power in majority games

Morelli, Massimo - 1998

This paper provides a co-operative as well as a non-cooperative analysis of weighted majority games. The co-operative solution concept introduced here, the Stable Demand Set, yields a meaningful selection within the Mas-Colell Bargaining Set, it contains the Core, it eliminates the "dominated"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608407

Contracting with externalities and outside options

Bloch, Francis; Gomes, Armando R. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002154849