Political parties are active when citizens choose among candidates in elections, and when winning candidates choose among policy alternatives in government. But the inextricably linked institutions, incentives, and behavior that determine these multistage choices are substantively complex and...

I conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate whether voters focus on the problem of electoral selection or if they instead focus on electoral sanctioning. If voters are forward-looking but also uncertain about politicians' unobservable characteristics, then it is rational to focus on...

We conduct an experiment in which groups are tasked with evaluating the truth of a set of politically relevant facts and statements, and we investigate whether communication improves information aggregation and the accuracy of group decisions. Our findings suggest that the effect of...

Credible tests of hypotheses about power require credible measures of power. Roll rates purport to measure the relative power of the parties in legislatures. This article develops and employs a baseline model to assess roll rates. Although on the surface roll rates have some intuitively...

We develop a game theoretic model in which shareholders maximize the value of their portfolio and can buy or sell shares. Liquidity generates a shareholder dilemma: Voting for the policy that seems optimal for the firm maximizes portfolio value only when pivotal; in all other instances it is...

We theoretically examine voting for corporate policies when shareholders or board members face a trade-off between maximizing firm value and implementing social objectives (like minimizing pollution). If voters care about one social objective, we show that voting can successfully aggregate...