This paper investigates in how far equity preferences may matter for climate negotiations. For this purposes we conducted a simple experiment with people who have been involved in international climate policy. The experiment, which was run via the Internet, consisted of two simple non-strategic...

Hinter der Forderung nach höherer Energieeffizienz stehen üblicherweise konkrete umwelt- und energiepolitische Ziele wie Klimaschutz, Versorgungssicherheit und Ressourcenschonung. Das vorliegende Papier analysiert diese Argumente und diskutiert mögliche Politikinstrumente zur Zielerreichung....

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players' benefit...

Bei der 26. UN-Klimakonferenz in Glasgow geht es um die Umsetzung der Ziele aus dem Pariser Klimaschutzabkommen. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die schrittweise Zielerhöhung der einzelnen Länder, die sich anschließend in konkreten Klimaschutzbeiträgen widerspiegeln sollen. Der vorliegende ZEW...

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...

In this study, the real demand for global and local environmental protection in Beijing, China, is elicited and investigated. Participants from Beijing were offered the opportunity to contribute to voluntary climate change mitigation by purchasing permits from two Chinese CO2 emissions trading...

In this study, the real demand for global and local environmental protection in Beijing, China, is elicited and investigated. Participants from Beijing were offered the opportunity to contribute to voluntary climate change mitigation by purchasing permits from two Chinese CO2 emissions trading...

In this paper, we extend the Fehr and Schmidt model of inequality aversion to a situation where the players differ with respect to their benefits and costs from contributions to a non-linear public good. A necessary condition for contributing to the public good is that the players’ benefit...