Empirical and experimental papers find that high-powered incentives may reduce performance rather than improve it; a phenomenon referred to as "choking under pressure". We show that competition for high ability workers nevertheless leads firms to offer high bonus payments, thereby deliberately...

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 (Pre-Bosman; or P), currently in use (Bosman; or B), and recently approved (Monti; or M) differ with...

We analyze the impact of three different transfer fee systems on payoffs, contract lengths, training and effort incentives in European football. The different regimes, being used until 1995 ("Pre-Bosman" or P), currently in use ("Bosman" or B), and recently approved ("Monti" or M) differ with...