This paper develops a tractable real options framework to analyze the eects of asym-metric information on investment and nancing decisions when rms require externalfunds to nance investment. Our analysis shows that corporate insiders can signal theirprivate information to outside investors using...

This paper develops a signalling game in which the decision to raise public equityis a real option of the …rm. Firms may use multiple signals to reveal their type:the timing of the IPO, the fraction of shares issued and the underpricing of shares.The model provides a tractable approach for...

We find that stocks exhibiting high dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts do not onlyunderperform in the U.S. but also in many European countries. Testing for the dispersioneffect in many countries calls for adequate multiple testing controls and we show that theU.S. dispersion effect...

We develop a dynamic model of corporate investment and financing decisions in whichcorporate insiders have superior information about the firm's growth prospects. We show thatrms with positive private information can credibly signal their type to outside investors usingthe timing of corporate...