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Commitment and conflict in unanimity bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2024
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046548
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Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2020
equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of … sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the … number of players increases. Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012545943
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Commitment and Conflict in Multilateral Bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2023
We theoretically investigate the effects of strategic pre-commitment in multilateral dynamic bargaining. Each round features a commitment stage in which players can declare that they will reject any proposal giving them less than a self-imposed threshold. Such declarations bind in the ensuing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015165974
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Bargaining as a struggle between competing attempts at commitment
Dutta, Rohan - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015206934
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Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2023
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015138046
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Commitment and conflict in unanimity bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2024
We theoretically investigate how the application of unanimity rule can lead to inefficient delay in collective decision …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014578010
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Commitment and conflict in multilateral bargaining
Miettinen, Topi; Vanberg, Christoph - 2020
equilibrium exists independently of the number of players, and the delay in this equilibrium is increasing in the number of … sufficiently large. The expected inefficiency due to delay at the least and at the most efficient equilibrium increases as the … number of players increases. Under any (super)majority rule, however, there is no equilibrium with delay or inefficiency. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012176463
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Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
Utset, Manuel A. - In: Games 14 (2023) 3, pp. 1-21
The paper studies bargaining games involving players with present-biased preferences. The paper shows that the relative timing of bargaining rewards and bargaining costs will determine whether the players' present-bias will affect bargaining outcomes. In cases where players agree to a bargain in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014422534