Vocational school graduates enjoy a higher employment probability than other types of graduates across industrial economies. This may result from either the signaling effects of vocational school degrees or skill complementarity between vocational schooling and work experience. Regarding wage...

Schooling, an observable signal, decreases its impact on wages as employers “publicly” learn workers’ hidden types over workers’ experience in the market. This symmetric employer learning hypothesis has been empirically contested by, first, asymmetry of incumbent and entrant employers,...

Employers use educational background as a signal of a workerfs latent ability. This signaling effect decreases as employers learn about the workerfs ability with his/her work experience, which results in negative coefficient of interaction term between schooling and experience in wage equation....

Employer learning model predicts the impact of schooling, an observable signal, on wages decreases with accumulation of experience. Workers, however, have incentives to invest in general human capital both at schools and workplaces such that experience and schooling are complements unless the...

Vocational school graduates enjoy a higher employment probability than other types of graduates across industrial economies. This may result from either the signaling effects of vocational school degrees or skill complementarity between vocational schooling and work experience. Regarding wage...