The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions...

This paper presents an experimental analysis of people’s behavior in situations involving both positive and negative reciprocity. The experiment implements sequences of two types of extensive form games called Punishment games and Trust games. The contemporaneous use of these two types of...

This paper studies the e_ect of introducing costly partner selection for the voluntary contribution to a public good. Subjects participate in six sequences of five rounds of a two-person public good game in partner design. At the end of each sequence subjects can select a new partner out of six...

The economic models of tax compliance predict that individuals should evade taxes when the expected benefit of cheating is greater than its expected cost. When this condition is fulfilled, the high compliance however observed remains a puzzle. In this paper, we investigate the role of emotions...

In this paper we introduce the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). With this software experimenters have a free, convenient and very powerful tool to organize their experiments and sessions in a standardized way. Additionally, ORSEE provides subject pool statistics, a...

We discuss several issues regarding the organization of economic laboratory experiments such as subject pool, recruitment, scheduling, and show how we solved them with the help of the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) version 2.0. With this integrated software...