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Repeated games with Finite Automata.
Ben-Porath, E. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1991
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005487153
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On the Interpretation of two Theoretical Models of Bargaining.
Rubinstein, A. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646850
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Simplicity of Solution Concepts: Subgame Perfect Equilibrium in Extensive Games v.s. Iteratively undominated Strategies in Normal games.
Glazer, J.; Rubinstein, A. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646852
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Unobserved Delegation.
Fershtman, C.; Kalai, E. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005646864
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A Rermark on Infinitely Repeated Extensive Games.
Rubinstein, A.; Wolnsky, A. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783337
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Naive Strategies in Zero-Sum Games.
Rubinstein, A.; Tversky, A. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783349
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Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backward Induction in Perfect Information Games.
Ben-Porath, E. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1992
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005675099
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Communication in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring.
Ben-Porath, E.; Kahneman, M. - Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University - 1993
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005672118